Rush to Judgement on David Hume

 

Kenda H. Asher

31. Oct. 2020

W

hen one first reads the footnote on race in David Hume’s essay “Of National Characters,” one rightly feels shocked:

I am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.[1]

When I first read this passage a few years ago, I was very much taken aback. After rereading it a few times, I—a student of Hume—found myself confused. The footnote disagrees not only with other writings Hume published but even with statements in the same essay. In fact, the footnote seems like a lampoon of vulgarity in light of the words that begin the essay: 

The vulgar are apt to carry all national characters to extremes; and having once established it as a principle, that any people are knavish, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no exception, but comprehend every individual under the same censure. Men of sense condemn these undistinguishing judgments...[2]

In another example, Hume criticizes the practice of slavery in the essay, “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations.” In the first paragraph of that essay, Hume writes: “As far, therefore, as observation reaches, there is no universal difference discernible in the human species.”[3] Clearly the sentiment from this statement is at odds with the footnote. Strangely, both the footnote and this anti-slavery essay were written around the same time.

In the concerning footnote, I puzzled especially over Hume’s sentence: “Not to mention our colonies, there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession.” I wondered why Hume includes the word “slaves” after the word “Negroe.” Hume writes in other essays, published in the same collection, that freedom was necessary to spur the growth of arts and science.[4] Of course, then, slaves would not distinguish themselves, regardless of race. There were free blacks during this time in Europe, so if he had omitted the word “slaves” then the statement would take on a more racialist nature. But in “Negroe slaves,” it is the word “slaves” that controls the meaning of the statement. Hume chose his words remarkably carefully, so it doesn’t make a lot of sense to suppose that here “Homer nods.”

When I read the original version of the footnote, published in 1753, I was even more confused. The original first sentence targets a much wider group:

I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.[5]

Again, Hume directly flouts the essay’s opening, and contradicts statements from other essays published or revised during the same period that he added the footnote. For instance, he references Chinese accomplishments in the areas named in both “The Rise of Arts and Sciences” and “Of the Balance of Trade”.

It is highly possible that these puzzles and others I describe in my paper, “Interpretations of Hume's Footnote on Race,” are unintended. Yet one should also consider the possibility that the contradictions were something more.

What motivations were there for Hume to write something so heinous if he did not fully believe it? It is possible, although less likely, that the footnote was satire.  Another possibility is that it was a tactic to help advance the reduction or abolition of slavery. It is obvious when reading Hume’s anti-slavery essay, “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations,” published soon after the footnote was added, that Hume had put a lot of thought into how to convince slaveholders and those who supported slavery in general that slavery was not in their interest.

The issues of race and slavery, in Hume’s time, were very much intertwined. Hume may have believed that moral condemnation on either issue, no matter how just, would have little impact with slavery’s supporters. Hume was well aware of how difficult it was to persuade a person against their prejudices. It would have been hard to find a middle ground with a slaveholder on the issue of race. Yet if one appeals to more tangible, long-term problems in the efficiency, sustainability, and practicality of slavery, communication might be possible and adjustments in thinking may occur. Hume may have echoed the feelings on racial differences held by proponents of slavery as a sort of introduction to remove the basic moral issue from his conversation with them. Thus there is a possibility that Hume added the infamous footnote to his essay not because he believed it, but to make his arguments against slavery more effective with his target audience—however ill-conceived such a tactic may have been.

As Hume himself might have concluded, let’s not rush to judgment. In the essay “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion,” Hume wrote:

In order to judge aright of a composition of genius, there are so many views to be taken in, so many circumstances to be compared, and such a knowledge of human nature requisite, that no man, who is not possessed of the soundest judgment, will ever make a tolerable critic in such performances. And this is a new reason for cultivating a relish in the liberal arts. Our judgment will strengthen by this exercise: We shall form juster notions of life...[6]


Kendra Asher is a doctoral student in economics at George Mason University, writing her dissertation on David Hume.


Notes:

[1] David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller, Thomas Hill Green, and Thomas Hodge Grose (Indianapolis, Ind: Liberty Fund, 1987), p. 208.

[2] Essays, p. 197.

[3] Essays, p. 378.

[4] See Hume’s Essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Science”.

[5] Essays, p. 629.

[6] Essays, p. 6.

 
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